The Howard S. Levie
Distinguished Essay:
Legal Advisers in the Field
During Armed Conflict
Yoram Dinstein

97 INT’L L. STUD. 917 (2021)

Volume 97

2021

Published by the Stockton Center for International Law
ISSN 2375-2831

Legal Advisers in the Field During Armed Conflict

Vol. 97

The Howard S. Levie
Distinguished Essay:
Legal Advisers in the Field
During Armed Conflict
Yoram Dinstein∗
CONTENTS
I.
II.

The Concept ............................................................................................ 918
Application in Practice ........................................................................... 919
A. The Appropriate Level of Command........................................ 919
B. The Role of the Legal Adviser in General ................................ 920
C. The Exception: Legal Advisers with De Facto Veto Power.. 922
III. Alleged Demerits of the System ........................................................... 923
A. Infringement of the Commander’s Freedom of Action? ....... 923
B. Legal Advisers in a Bind? ............................................................ 925
IV. Legal Advice in Context......................................................................... 925
A. Dissemination ............................................................................... 925
B. Orders and Instructions .............................................................. 926
C. Training in General ...................................................................... 928
D. Training of Legal Advisers .......................................................... 929
V. Accountability for War Crimes ............................................................. 930
A. Military Commanders and War Crimes .................................... 930
B. Legal Advisers Giving Erroneous Counsel .............................. 931
C. Legal Advisers and Complicity ................................................... 933
D. Military Commanders and Mistake of Law .............................. 934
VI. Conclusions ............................................................................................. 935

∗ Professor Emeritus, Tel Aviv University (Israel); Member, Institut de Droit International;
Former Stockton Professor, Naval War College (1999–2000, 2002–2003).

917

International Law Studies

2021

I.

THE CONCEPT

L

egal advisers are supposed to be made available to military commanders,
particularly during hostilities, as a product of AP/I (Protocol I of 1977 Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949). Article 82 of AP/I proclaims:
The High Contracting Parties at all times, and the Parties to the conflict in
time of armed conflict, shall ensure that legal advisers are available, when
necessary, to advise military commanders at the appropriate level on the
application of the Conventions and this Protocol and on the appropriate
instruction to be given to the armed forces on this subject. 1

This treaty stipulation was quite innovative in 1977, 2 but it has definitely
caught on thenceforth. Needless to say, all Contracting Parties to AP/I are
bound to comply with Article 82 (unless an explicit reservation has been
recorded at the time of ratification or accession 3). But even as far as nonContracting Parties are concerned, it is noteworthy that the United States—
which thoroughly objects to numerous provisions of AP/I—by no means
dissents from Article 82. Indeed, the US Department of Defense Law of War
Manual (citing Article 82) attests that qualified legal advisers are made available at all levels of command to provide advice about law of war compliance
during planning and execution of operations. 4
A study of the practice of States, made by the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross), confirms that the norm requiring that legal advisers
be made available to advise military commanders in time of armed conflict
currently reflects customary international law. 5 The prevalence of germane
1. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 82, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3, 41 [hereinafter AP/I].
2. See K.J. Partsch, Article 82, in NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
OF 1949, at 564 (Michael Bothe et al. eds., 1982).
3. There are a host of reservations to AP/I. See THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A
COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 792 (Dietrich
Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 4th ed. 2004). However, none of them deflects from Article
82.
4. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF
WAR MANUAL § 18.5.1 (rev. ed. Dec. 2016) [hereinafter U.S. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL].
5. See 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 500 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005).
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States’ practice cannot be gainsaid, although some critics maintain that it is
uncertain whether non-Contracting Parties act the way they do because they
feel that they are bound by a customary legal obligation or simply “as a matter of operational practicality.” 6
The language of Article 82 is somewhat unusual. As the ICRC Commentary on AP/I stresses, the clause combines a clear-cut obligation (immanent
in the phrase “shall ensure”) with a certain degree of flexibility (derived from
the unspecified reference to “the appropriate level” and the qualifying words
“when necessary”). 7
II.

APPLICATION IN PRACTICE

A. The Appropriate Level of Command
Each State is empowered to determine the appropriate level of military command to which it is necessary to make legal advisers available. 8 In the past,
the operational level considered most suitable in land warfare seemed to have
been, in the main, the headquarters of a division or a larger unit. 9 But there
is a growing tendency to post legal advisers to brigades, 10 and even to smaller
military formations acting independently. 11 In air and maritime campaigns,
legal advisers will commonly be assigned to central (theater) commands.
Plainly, an attachment of legal advisers to lower levels of command can
prove to be unfeasible to the point of incongruity. 12 A legal adviser cannot
6. David Turns, Implementation and Compliance, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY
ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 354, 362 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst &

Susan Breau eds., 2007).
7. Jean de Preux, Article 82, in COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8
JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 947, 949 (Yves Sandoz
et al. eds., 1987).
8. See Leslie C. Green, The Role of Legal Advisers in the Armed Forces, 7 ISRAEL YEARBOOK
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 154, 163 (1977).
9. See Günther Moritz, Legal Advisers in Armed Forces: Position and Functions, 21 MILITARY
LAW AND LAW OF WAR REVIEW 483, 486 (1982).
10. See Amendment 7 of 2013 to page 413 of the original 2004 UK Manual. UNITED
KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 413
n.16 (2004).
11. See J.F.R. Boddens Hosang, International Humanitarian Law, Self-Defence and Rules of
Engagement: Application in the Netherlands, 48 COLLEGIUM 172, 174 n.5 (2018).
12. See Michael C. Denny, The Impact of Article 82 of Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions
on the Organization and Operation of a Division SJA Office, THE ARMY LAWYER, Apr. 1980, at 14,
17.
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be ensconced in the turret of a tank, in the cockpit of a jet fighter, or on the
deck of a missile boat. That said, the efficacy of modern digital communications (including e-mails) is such that apposite legal advice can be relayed from
headquarters to subordinate units with scarcely any time-lag. 13
In the 1945 war crimes trial of The Peleus, a British judge advocate famously said: “It is quite obvious that no sailor and no soldier can carry with
him a library of international law, or have immediate access to a professor in
that subject who can tell him whether or not a particular command is a lawful
one.” 14
The passage relates, of course, to obedience to orders rather than to actions taken by commanders. Leaving that aside, the availability of professional legal advisers to assist military commanders is devised to surmount
the obstacle adverted to by the judge advocate. Lawyers, too, may admittedly
be in want of a library of international law or a specialist’s opinion. But that
should only marginally handicap them. If a problem strays outside the area
of expertise of legal advisers, they ought to be able to tap bibliographical
resources—as well as benefit from the feedback of colleagues and superiors—by transmitting and receiving messages electronically.
B. The Role of the Legal Adviser in General
Whatever the operational layer to which legal advisers are seconded, their
duty is to advise military commanders. Article 82 refers to advice on (i) the
application of the Geneva Conventions and AP/I, as well as (ii) their instruction. “In practice, legal advice to the armed forces is not limited to the Geneva Conventions and AP I but encompasses the whole range of public international law linked to international humanitarian law (IHL) and the law
of armed conflicts.” 15 In other words, the broadest gamut of LOAC (law of
armed conflict) is within the ambit of the interaction between military commanders and their legal advisers.

13. See WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, THE LAW OF TARGETING 484 (2012).
14. The Peleus Trial [1945] (British Military Court for the Trial of War Criminals, Hamburg, 1945), reported in UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, 1 LAW REPORTS OF
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1, 12 (1947).
15. Maiki Kuhn & Antje C. Berger, Legal Advisers in the Armed Forces, in THE ROLE OF
LEGAL ADVISERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 337, 338 (Andraž Zidar & Jean-Pierre Gauci
eds., 2016).
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Naturally, the appointment of legal advisers to field tasks is a means rather than an end in itself. Legal advisers are made available to military commanders for a purpose. It is pointless to deploy legal advisers to assist military commanders unless the military commanders in effect consult them
when LOAC issues arise. 16 For their part, legal advisers have to be prepared
to caution military commanders against anticipated actions that are incompatible with LOAC, outlining alternative options. 17 Moreover, “[t]he idea
that advice is given only when sought must be discarded.” 18 Legal advisers
are expected to offer professional advice “even proprio motu.” 19 To be able to
do that, legal advisers incontestably need access to the military commanders
themselves and to the information that is crucial for the discharge of their
duties. 20
As a rule, legal advisers have sufficient rank and experience to be able to
stand up to the challenge of contributing to the planning and execution of
military operations in a skillful manner that invites esteem. 21 But, since the
thinking of legal advisers may not correspond with the ingrained inclinations
of military commanders, legal advisers (albeit normally embedded in the
armed forces, rather than serving as civilians 22) have to be somewhat detached from the straight chain of command. 23 Correspondingly, the German
Law of Armed Conflict Manual spells out that “military superiors are only authorized to direct legal advisers in administrative matters, not in the assessment of legal matters.” 24
Be their professional counsel as it may, legal advisers acting pursuant to
Article 82 are there to advise military commanders and “not to replace
16. See G.I.A.D. Draper, Role of Legal Advisers in Armed Forces, 202 INTERNATIONAL
REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 6, 15 (1978).
17. See A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 370 (3d ed. 2012).
18. G.I.A.D. Draper, Intervention, 21 MILITARY LAW AND LAW OF WAR REVIEW 515,
517 (1982).
19. See de Preux, supra note 7, at 953.
20. See UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, LEGAL SUPPORT TO JOINT OPERATIONS 83 (3d ed. 2018).
21. See Levator Norsworthy Jr., Organization for Battle: The Judge Advocate’s Responsibility
under Article 82 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, 93 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 9, 18 (1981).
22. See Michael L. Kramer & Michael N. Schmitt, Lawyers on Horseback? Thoughts on Judge
Advocates and Civil-Military Relations, 55 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1407, 1426 (2008).
23. See Christopher Greenwood, Historical Development and Legal Basis, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1, 43 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2008).
24. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (GERMANY), ZDV 15/2, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT MANUAL ¶ 154 (2013).
921
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them.” 25 Differently put, the role of a legal adviser is “confined to advice
only” and not to the implementation of that advice. 26 At the end of the day,
the decision-making is left squarely in the hands of the military commander.
C. The Exception: Legal Advisers with De Facto Veto Power
There is a notable exception to the rule concerning the purely advisory character of the legal counsel submitted to military commanders, and that is Israel. IDF (Israel Defense Forces) legal advisers are functioning within a
MAG (Military Advocate General) Corps. Appointed directly by the Minister
of Defense, the MAG—who serves on the IDF General Staff—acts independently of the Chief of Staff insofar as legal matters are concerned. The
MAG is “subject to no authority but the law” and is “guided only by Israel’s
Attorney General.” 27 Furthermore, the MAG’s professional independence
“extends to every subordinate military attorney serving as an officer within
the MAG Corps.” 28
In theory, as asseverated by a former Israeli MAG, “the final decision on
all matters” even in Israel is that the military commander “can accept or reject the legal advice tendered.” 29 Yet, when all is said and done, once a legal
opinion endorsed by the MAG is rendered, Israeli military commanders
“have no option but to follow the advice of their lawyers.” 30 In consequence,
when acting under the personal aegis of the MAG, Israeli legal advisers have
gained “a certain de facto veto power” vis-à-vis military commanders. 31
The de facto veto phenomenon is quite unique. Israel is not a Contracting Party to AP/I, so there is no need to reconcile its practice with Article
25. Jean de Preux, Article 87, in COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra
note 7, at 1017, 1021.
26. Dov Shefi, The Status of the Legal Adviser to the Armed Forces: His Functions and Powers,
100 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 119, 128 (1983).
27. See Report Published under the Auspices of Government of Israel, The 2014 Gaza
Conflict (“Operation Protective Edge”): Factual and Legal Aspects, 45 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 237, 406 (2015) [hereinafter The 2014 Gaza Conflict].
28. Id. at 406–7.
29. Dov Shefi, Intervention: The Status of the Legal Adviser to the Armed Forces – His Functions
and Powers, 21 MILITARY LAW AND LAW OF WAR REVIEW 507, 508 (1982).
30. See Michael N. Schmitt & John J. Merriam, The Tyranny of Context: Israeli Targeting
Practices in Legal Perspective, 37 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 53, 86–87 (2015).
31. Amichai Cohen, Legal Operational Advice in the Israeli Defense Forces: The International
Law Department and the Changing Nature of International Humanitarian Law, 26 CONNECTICUT
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 367, 381 (2011).
922

Legal Advisers in the Field During Armed Conflict

Vol. 97

82. However, even if inspected through the lens of Article 82, it is impossible
to deny the prerogative of a State to rein in its military commanders and to
tip the scale in the balance of authority in favor of legal advisers.
III.

ALLEGED DEMERITS OF THE SYSTEM

A. Infringement of the Military Commander’s Freedom of Action?
Curiously, it was in Israel that serious doubt has been cast on the very concept of posting legal advisers to advise military commanders during combat.
This came about in a report of a Public Commission of Inquiry set up by the
government—with retired Justice E. Winograd in the Chair—in order to investigate all the dimensions of the 2006 hostilities with Hezbollah (known in
Israel as the Second Lebanon War). Chapter 14 of the final Winograd Report, published in 2008, was devoted to diverse aspects of international law;
and it addressed at some length the specific topic of legal advisers made
available to military commanders. 32
The Winograd Report registered that—in the course of the 2006
fighting—representatives of the MAG dispensed legal advice in real time at
the Headquarters of the IDF Northern Command, and in some instances
also in subordinate units. 33 Without mentioning Article 82 of AP/I, the Report alluded to the similarity of the Israeli practice to that prevalent in other
Western armed forces and remarked that many benefits can be derived from
it. 34 Even so, the Report queried whether the practice is desirable, since in
the jaundiced view of the Commission (i) LOAC norms are often unclear
and equivocal 35 and (ii) overreliance on legal advice in the midst of hostilities
is liable to divert responsibility from military commanders to their legal advisers and to disrupt operational activities. 36
The Winograd Commission concluded that, on the whole, it would be
better for military commanders in the field to concentrate on combat rather
than spend crucial time in consulting with legal advisers. 37 The Commission
32. 1 FINAL REPORT OF THE WINOGRAD COMMISSION 481 (2008) (in Hebrew). An
unofficial English translation of most of chapter 14 appears in 2 HOW DOES LAW PROTECT
IN WAR? 1276 (Marco Sassòli et al. eds., 3d ed. 2011). (References below will be made to
the paragraph numbers to enable following all the key points in the English translation.)
33. Id. ¶ 26.
34. Id. ¶ 27.
35. Id. ¶ 21.
36. Id. ¶ 29.
37. Id. ¶ 31.
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preferred a policy of (i) instilling in combatants the legal norms of conduct
prior to action; (ii) reviewing the action afterwards, inter alia, in the context
of incurring responsibility when legal norms are flagrantly breached; yet (iii)
vesting decision-makers with freedom of action when fighting is ongoing. 38
The Winograd Commission’s approach purported to safeguard military
commanders from any distraction in the heat of battle. However, on top of
colliding head-on with lessons learned in wide-ranging experience accumulated since the adoption of Article 82, the Report overlooked the level of the
military command to which legal advisers are designated. After all, it has
never been contemplated that commanders of small units under fire should
take time out to consult lawyers about critical decisions that may have to be
cemented in split seconds. Legal advisers are present at some relative distance from the front line, epitomized by the headquarters of a division or a
brigade (the usual levels benchmarking their assignment). In these surroundings, the pace of events—despite its intensity—allows some pause for reflection. Staff discussions are routinely held, in both the planning and execution
phases of operations, and teamwork is taken for granted. Is it logical that, of
all potential dialogues, only consultations with legal advisers are to be excluded? When all pertinent data (encompassing the choice of means and
methods of warfare, the interpretation of intelligence, the allocation and coordination of resources, etc.) are synthesized at headquarters, input by legal
advisers would be conspicuous by its absence.
The Winograd Commission was confident that, by eliminating from the
equation time-consuming discourses with legal advisers, it was shielding the
interests of military commanders who would thereby retain their full discretion in combat. But the Report is afflicted by a paradox. On the one hand,
the Commission noted that the initiative for legal advice during the 2006
hostilities frequently originated from the military units engaged. 39 It even
brought to the fore the apprehension that military commanders’ concern
about possible criminal prosecution for LOAC breaches might paralyze
them, thus detrimentally affecting operational missions. 40 On the other hand,
the Commission rejected legal advisers as an antidote for that potential paralysis.
It is counter-intuitive to believe that military commanders would choose
to face the odium of protracted future prosecutions, liable to taint their reputation and harm their careers, rather than briefly pause for consultations
38. Id. ¶ 30.
39. Id. ¶ 26.
40. Id. ¶ 23.
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with legal advisers. The Winograd Commission was simply off the mark in
striving to reverse the relentless global tide that enables military commanders
to obtain counsel from legal advisers at present, in order to stave off the risk
of going through a future via dolorosa of showing just cause for their actions.
B. Legal Advisers in a Bind?
One argument brought up in the Winograd Report deserves particular heed.
The Commission propounded that it would be preferable for the legal advice
echelon not to place itself in a situation where it might be precluded from
rendering professional post factum opinion, inasmuch as it has already sanctioned the action when in progress. 41
This last assertion is cogent in the Israeli context, taking into account
that the legal adviser (if backed by the MAG) functions virtually as a fullfledged participant in the decision-making process of the military command.
While there is no personal union between the individual legal adviser and
any post-op investigator, it must be underscored that the MAG is entrusted
with the ultimate review authority of all complaints concerning IDF misconduct. 42 If the MAG is brought into the loop at the outset—and gives a personal stamp of approval to certain measures resorted to during combat—it
may be persuasively argued that some other authority ought to review accusations of malfeasance relating to the self-same measures.
Outside Israel, the sharp edge of the argument is largely blunted. When
legal advisers act in a purely consultative capacity, there is no reason for excessive misgivings about the potential role of the head of the relevant JAG
(Judge Advocate General) Corps in any post-op inquiry into decisions taken
by a military commander.
IV.

LEGAL ADVICE IN CONTEXT

A. Dissemination
It goes without saying that the presence of legal advisers offering counsel to
military commanders in the field cannot by itself safeguard observance of
LOAC. A modicum of familiarity of the military commanders with the basic
41. Id. ¶ 32.
42. On the legal mechanisms for investigating complaints against IDF conduct, see The
2014 Gaza Conflict, supra note 27, at 409.
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legal norms regulating the conduct of hostilities is an essential precondition
for the effective implementation of LOAC. 43
In accordance with Article 83 of AP/I, Contracting Parties undertake (in
paragraph 1) to disseminate the Geneva Conventions and AP/I as widely as
possible—in particular, by including their study in programs of military instruction—and, more significantly for the purposes of this essay, paragraph
2 prescribes: “Any military or civilian authorities who, in time of armed conflict, assume responsibilities in respect of the application of the Conventions
and this Protocol shall be fully acquainted with the text thereof.” 44
The general obligation incumbent on States to disseminate LOAC as
widely as possible to their armed forces is accentuated already in all four 1949
Geneva Conventions for the protection of war victims, 45 as well as in the
1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, 46 and in the 1980
Convention on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons. 47 Indubitably,
this is customary international law today. 48
B. Orders and Instructions
Article 1 of Hague Conventions (II) and (IV) of 1899 and 1907, with respect
to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, imposes an obligation on States
to issue instructions to their armed forces in conformity with the Regulations

43. See Knut Dörmann, Dissemination and Monitoring Compliance of International Humanitarian Law, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW FACING NEW CHALLENGES 227, 228
(Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg & Volker Epping eds., 2007).
44. AP/I, supra note 1, art. 83(2), at 41.
45. Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field art. 47, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 62 [hereinafter Geneva Convention (I)]; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 48, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 114 [hereinafter Geneva Convention (II)]; Convention (III)
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 127, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135, 236; Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War art. 144, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 386.
46. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict
art. 25, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240, 258–60 [hereinafter 1954 Hague Convention].
47. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects art. 6, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, 165 [hereinafter CCW].
48. See 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 5, at 501–2.
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annexed to the instrument. 49 The idea goes back to the 1864 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in
the Field. 50 It has progressed to Article 45 of Geneva Convention (I) and
Article 46 of Geneva Convention (II) of 1949, which stipulate that each party
to the conflict—through its commanders-in-chief—shall ensure the detailed
execution of the respective instrument and even provide for unforeseen circumstances (consonant with the general principles of the Conventions). 51
The Geneva texts from 1864 to 1949 use the term “Commanders-inChief” in the plural, thereby indicating that the enunciated obligation is not
limited to the supreme level of authority but extends to military command
in a more general sense. 52 Article 87(2) of AP/I ordains that, “commensurate
with their level of responsibility,” commanders are required to ensure that
their subordinates are aware of their obligations under the Geneva Conventions and AP/I. 53
The ultimate responsibility in the domain of LOAC devolves on the
States concerned. Article 80(2) of AP/I lays down: “The High Contracting
Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall give orders and instructions to
ensure the observance of the Conventions and this Protocol, and shall supervise their execution.” 54 In a sense, orders and instructions are meant to
“translate” LOAC for ready use by the armed forces. 55
Supervision of execution of orders and instructions has several dimensions, the most self-evident being the imposition of discipline in the armed
forces to enforce LOAC observance. But supervision also connotes the implantation of LOAC into military doctrine. This can be done in multifarious
ways. A leading technique is the promulgation of national military manuals,
49. Convention No. II with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 1,
July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403; Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land art. 1, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539.
50. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in
the Field, Aug. 22, 1864, 22 Stat. 940, 129 Consol. T.S. 361. See also THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICTS, supra note 3, at 365, 367 (Article 8).
51. Geneva Convention (I), supra note 45, art. 45, at 61; Geneva Convention (II), supra
note 45, art. 46, at 114.
52. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE
FIRST GENEVA CONVENTION: CONVENTION (I) FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD ¶¶ 2710–13, at
965–66 (2016).
53. AP/I, supra note 1, art. 87(2), at 43.
54. Id., art. 80(2), at 40.
55. See FRITS KALSHOVEN, REFLECTIONS ON THE LAW OF WAR: COLLECTED ESSAYS
625 (2007).
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such as the aforementioned US Department of Defense Law of War Manual
(bolstered by complementary Commander’s Handbooks released by the Army
and Marines, 56 as well as by the Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard 57). Other
mechanisms for inculcating LOAC norms in the armed forces are also in use
(telling examples are the Air Force’s The Law of Air, Space, and Cyber Operations 58 and the Army’s Law of Armed Conflict Deskbook 59).
C. Training in General
It is not enough for States to enact orders and instructions or to produce
manuals and handbooks. It is indispensable to provide all tiers of the armed
forces with proper LOAC training. Legal advisers under Article 82 of AP/I
are required to offer counsel to military commanders not only on the application of LOAC but also on “the appropriate instruction to be given the
armed forces on this subject.”
Appropriate instruction in LOAC must commence in peacetime. While
it is mandatory to train every soldier, sailor, and aviator in fundamental
norms of LOAC, attention must be given to the specialized positions held
and functions performed in the military hierarchy. 60 Senior commanders cannot be treated equally with junior (or non-commissioned) officers: the higher
the rank of commanders, the better acquainted with LOAC they should be.
Military academies for graduating officers can therefore stick to fairly introductory courses, whereas staff and war colleges should focus on a more advanced syllabus. Obviously, the main thrust of all training has to be attuned
to the priorities of the specific Service (with correlative emphasis on land,
naval, or air warfare, as the case may be).
56. HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES
MARINE CORPS, FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
OF LAND WARFARE (2019) (superseding an earlier version of 1956).
57. U.S. NAVY, MARINE CORPS & COAST GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCTP 1110B/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS (2017) (superseding an earlier version of 2007).
58. JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL & COMMANDANT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. AIR FORCE, THE LAW OF AIR, SPACE, AND CYBER OPERATIONS (4th
ed. 2020).
59. NATIONAL SECURITY LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK (2020).
60. See Elzbieta Mikos-Skuza, Dissemination of the Conventions, including in Time of Armed
Conflict, in THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY 597, 604 (Andrew Clapham
et al. eds., 2015).
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Considering that a study of LOAC is only one component in the training
curriculum of officers of whatever rank, a greater exposure of senior commanders to LOAC does not signify that they are likely to acquire more than
sketchy legal proficiency. It is consequently important to verify that commanders absorb the core rules of LOAC falling within their actual remit. 61
Bearing in mind that commanders may not be fully conversant with the relevant LOAC strictures, legal advisers are called upon to assist them in weighing military versus legal constraints.
D. Training of Legal Advisers
The “unstated but necessary corollary” of the general training requisite is
that legal advisers themselves must get their share of the “appropriate instruction.” 62 The average graduate of law school is rarely adept at the intricacies of LOAC. That being the case, the necessary training of armed forces
must begin with in-depth and well-rounded 63 preparation of legal advisers
for their missions in the field.
Training a typical attorney to become a legal adviser with LOAC adroitness is not just a matter of polishing some edges. The sheer size of the materials to be perused speaks for itself. For instance, the US Department of
Defense Law of War Manual runs into almost 1,200 pages and each of the
complementary Service handbooks is comprised of hundreds of additional
pages. 64 Besides, LOAC training cannot be confined to memorizing manuals
and studying general orders. There is no way for wide-spectrum texts to
come to grips with every concrete challenge engendered by combat contingencies. When the chips are down, legal advisers should be trained to cope
not only with conventional scenarios but also with unforeseen circumstances
(cf. Geneva Article 45/46).

61. See 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 5, at 502.
62. Michael A. Newton, Modern Military Necessity: The Role & Relevance of Military Lawyers,
12 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 877, 890 (2007).
63. By way of illustration, legal advisers “need to be thoroughly trained in the protection
of cultural property” in light of the provision of Article 25 of the 1954 Hague Convention.
1954 Hague Convention, supra note 46, art. 25, at 258–60. JIRI TOMAN, THE PROTECTION
OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE EVENT OF ARMED CONFLICT 276 (1996).
64. The 1995 version of the U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS (see supra note 57) even had an elaborate Annotated Supplement, published as 73
INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES (A.R. Thomas and James C. Duncan eds., 1999).
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The United States has established an outstanding Army JAG School, 65
with parallel Naval and Air Force JAG Schools in operation. Yet, not every
country enjoys the luxury of such expensive educational facilities. If national
training resources are limited, States can obtain external sustenance from
various foreign sources. 66 It is also possible to profit from training opportunities available in international centers like the San Remo Institute of International Humanitarian Law, which for many years has provided LOAC
courses (in several languages) for both lawyers and operational officers from
across the globe. 67
V.

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR WAR CRIMES

A. Military Commanders and War Crimes
We live in an era of constant upsurge in public pressure for exposing the
military community to the ordeal of war crimes trials. After decades during
which the international community declined to hold such trials, 68 a new zeitgeist has evolved, culminating in the establishment in 1998 of the International Criminal Court (starting to function in 2002). Even in countries like
the United States that have not accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, there
is a growing demand that members of the armed forces will be subjected to
the full brunt of the domestic penal code if and when they perpetrate serious
breaches of LOAC.
The person who is especially in the limelight of any war crimes investigation is patently the military commander. When the record is examined, any
LOAC admonition by a legal adviser against pursuing a questionable course
of action during combat acquires special significance by hindsight. A military
commander who ignores professional remonstrance in flagrante should not
be surprised by the ensuing criminal consequences. Indeed, if war crimes
65. On the JAG School, see Richard P. DiMeglio, Training Army Judge Advocates to Advise
Commanders as Operational Law Attorneys, 54 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 1185, 1192–95
(2013).
66. See Laurie R. Blank & Gregory P. Noone, LAW OF WAR TRAINING: RESOURCES
FOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LEADERS 6–7 (2d ed. 2013).
67. For the origins of the San Remo military courses, see Giorgio Blais, The International
Institute of Humanitarian Law (San Remo) and Its International Military Courses on the Law of Armed
Conflict, 37 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 451 (1997).
68. The failure of the international community for half a century to punish war criminals was underscored by Howard S. Levie, War Crimes, 72 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES
95, 107 (1998).
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charges lead to a verdict of conviction, a military commander’s refusal to
follow professional legal advice will inescapably be considered an aggravating
circumstance affecting the sentence to be determined.
B. Legal Advisers Giving Erroneous Counsel
There is a natural tendency to envisage every legal adviser as a metaphorical
brake, applying pressure on the military commander to desist from conduct
that might clash with LOAC. But legal advisers are not infallible and they are
liable to give a go-ahead signal to acts branded as war crimes in later judicial
proceedings.
To analyze the subject in its most rudimentary form, it may be useful to
explore the paradigmatic scenario in which a military command is engaged
in comprising a list (or “bank”) of potential targets for attack by military
aircraft, missiles, artillery, or otherwise. The targets’ selection must be based
on the LOAC cardinal principle of distinction between military objectives
and civilian objects. 69 When looked at from the angle of penal accountability,
the pivotal text is Article 8(2)(b)(ii) of the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court defining as a war crime the act of “[i]ntentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are not military
objectives.” 70
Targeting is a multifaceted operation that includes taking of precautions
and minimizing collateral damage to innocent civilians. 71 But the quintessential first step is to identify military objectives (i.e., lawful targets for attack),
in contradistinction to civilian objects. Under Article 52(2) of AP/I, “military
objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total
or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling
at the time, offers a definite military advantage.” 72 The United States has
expressly accepted this definition of military objectives, 73 which is shored up
69. On the cardinal principle of distinction, see Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 78 (July 8).
70. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(ii), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90, 95.
71. On the whole process of targeting, see Geoffrey S. Corn, Targeting, Command Judgment, and a Proposed Quantum of Information Component, 77 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW 437, 444–
50 (2012).
72. AP/I, supra note 1, art. 52(2), at 27.
73. See U.S. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 4, § 19.20.1.1.
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by other treaty texts. 74 The definition has been held by the Eritrea-Ethiopia
Claims Commission to reflect customary international law. 75
Although buttressed by consensus, the abstract terminology of Article
52(2) does not really enlighten military commanders faced with practical dilemmas in concrete battle situations. 76 Commanders are often baffled by the
question whether a particular object (say, a TV broadcasting installation77)
qualifies as a military objective by nature or a given area outside the combat
zone is classified as a military objective by location. 78 Not to mention the
broader quandary whether “war-sustaining” (at variance from “warfighting”) can constitute military objectives. 79 If legal advisers are at hand,
military commanders will presumably be eager to consult them on the resolution of these and similar perplexities. Interestingly, the German Commander’s Handbook states categorically that “[l]egal advisers are to be involved
in the process of targeting.” 80
It is only natural to assume that—when consulted—legal advisers would
do whatever they can to steer military commanders away from proscribed
conduct. 81 But the Winograd Commission should be complimented for putting its finger on the plight of a military commander whose legal adviser
makes a wrong call by approving certain acts that are regarded by third parties as a war crime. 82 The issue was raised by the Commission in the singular

74. See Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and
Other Devices art. 2(4), Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168, 168; Protocol on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons art. 1(3), Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 171,
172.
75. Partial Award, Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related Claims, Eritrea’s
Claims 1, 3, 5, 9–13, 14, 21, 25 & 26 (Eri. v. Eth.), 26 R.I.I.A. 291, 332 (Eri.–Eth. Claims
Comm’n 2005), reprinted in 45 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 396, 418 (2006).
76. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 103–4 (3d ed. 2016).
77. See Arne W. Dahl, Military Objectives by Nature, 48 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 1, 16–17 (2018).
78. See IAN HENDERSON, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF TARGETING 56–57 (2009).
79. The U.S. position is resoundingly affirmative. U.S. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL,
supra note 4, § 5.6.6.2. Contra SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE
TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA 148–50 (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995).
80. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (GERMANY), COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK: LEGAL BASES FOR THE OPERATION OF NAVAL FORCES ¶ 321 (2002).
81. See Laura A. Dickinson, Military Lawyers on the Battlefield: An Empirical Account of International Law Compliance, 104 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 26 (2010).
82. 1 FINAL REPORT OF THE WINOGRAD COMMISSION, supra note 32, ¶ 27.
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normative landscape of Israel. However, the peril of legal advisers proffering
possibly faulty counsel to military commanders is fraught in every country.
Clearly, the fact that a military commander has been assured by a legal
adviser that a specific object passes muster as a military objective cannot be
regarded as conclusive. An eventual judicial probe may infer from the same
set of circumstances that (contrary to the legal adviser’s opinion) the object
was truly civilian in character. Would the military commander and/or the
legal adviser then be exposed to war crimes prosecution by virtue of Article
8(2)(b)(ii) of the Rome Statute?
C. Legal Advisers and Complicity
The war crime defined in Article 8(2)(b)(ii) is couched in terms of “[i]ntentionally directing attacks against civilian objects.” Evidently, the direction of
attacks must be ascribed exclusively to the military commander, who—if culpable of the war crime—would be convicted as the principal actor. However,
if the legal adviser dismisses doubts about the military status of an object
against which an attack is to be directed, would it not be possible to charge
him/her as an accomplice to the war crime? Aiding, abetting, and otherwise
assisting in the commission of a crime are grounds of individual responsibility in keeping with Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute. 83 Aiding or abetting
may consist of encouragement or lending moral support to the perpetration
of a war crime. 84
Judges and prosecutors, acting as accessories abetting criminal activities,
can be found guilty of war crimes: this has been judicially confirmed in the
setting of the acts of barbarism perpetrated under the Nazi regime. 85 No
actual case law exists stigmatizing legal advisers in the field as accomplices in
criminal activity. Yet, it would be hard to refute the proposition that in principle they can be deemed complicit in the commission of war crimes. 86

83. Rome Statute, supra note 70, art. 25(3)(c), at 105.
84. See Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶
102 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Feb. 25, 2004).
85. See Notes on the Case of the Justice Trial (Trial of Altstötter and Others), UNITED
NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, 6 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 76–
78, 84–90 (1948); BOOTHBY, supra note 13, at 484.
86. See Ellia Ciammaichella, A Legal Advisor’s Responsibility to the International Community:
When Is Legal Advice a War Crime?, 41 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1143, 1147
(2007).
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D. Military Commanders and Mistake of Law
There is a corollary to the conundrum of complicity in war crimes by legal
advisers. That is the query whether—by consulting with a legal adviser and
getting a green light for directing an attack against a preselected object—a
military commander might be relieved of individual accountability for a war
crime under Article 8(2)(b)(ii). It must not be forgotten that the direction of
attacks against civilian objects constitutes a war crime only if it is done
“[i]ntentionally.” Pursuant to Article 30 of the Rome Statute and unless otherwise provided, an overall requirement of a mental element of “knowledge
and intent” is postulated as a condition of criminal responsibility. 87
Knowledge “means awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence
will occur in the ordinary course of events,” and intent denotes that a person
means to cause a certain consequence. 88 Can it be averred that a military
commander, who has been assured by a legal adviser that a concrete object
constitutes a military objective, acted with knowledge and intent to direct an
attack against a civilian object?
The present author believes that it would be exceedingly difficult (if not
impossible) to hold a military commander guilty of a war crime in such a
frame of reference, assuming that the action was carried out bona fide and
the legal advice was not manifestly wrong. The rationale for absolving the
military commander is that, notwithstanding the existence of an actus reus,
there would be no mens rea. By relying on legal advice, tendered by an expert
formally deployed to serve in the command post in compliance with LOAC,
a military commander may be deemed to have done all that he/she was reasonably expected and required to do.
An attempt has been made to distinguish between a military commander
requesting legal assistance and one receiving unsolicited advice: “A commander cannot be exempted from liability for having relied on wrong advice
from his legal advisor. Yet, the fact that he asked for advice keeps the possibility of resort to the defence of mistake of law open.” 89
The active/passive distinction has its attractions. But, once the military
commander abides by legal advice offered by a person earmarked for that

87. Rome Statute, supra note 70, art. 30, at 107.
88. Id.
89. ELIES VAN SLIEDGERT, INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 274 (2012).
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purpose congruent with LOAC, it seems immaterial how the advice percolated. The gravamen of the military commander’s predicament is that the
action was prompted by spurious professional guidance.
The subject-matter under discussion ties in with the provision of Article
32(2) of the Rome Statute, according to which a “mistake of law” may exceptionally be “a ground for excluding criminal responsibility if it negates the
mental element required by such a crime.” 90 Arguendo, a misleading legal
advice validating action by the military commander would negate the mental
element required by the war crime defined in Article 8(2)(b)(ii).
An authoritative solution to the problem must await elucidation by the
International Criminal Court. Most scholars have skirted the issue, and few
insights can be elicited from the legal literature. It has been commented that
“the conditions under which a military commander can use a wrong legal
advice as defence are, in any case, narrow.” 91 But, narrow as these conditions
may be, there is a compelling need to recognize that—in the final analysis—
specious legal advice may exonerate military commanders from criminal responsibility. 92
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

There can be little doubt that the participation of legal advisers in the deliberative functioning of military headquarters during armed conflict is of vital
importance. The mere attendance of legal advisers in staff meetings introduces into the operational agenda the imperative need to pay due regard to
the law. 93 With legal advisers present, it is difficult for military commanders
to plead ignorance or oversight of LOAC. 94 If a legal adviser gains trust and
credibility, numerous prospective breaches of LOAC can be screened and
forestalled thanks to timely intervention.
The Winograd Commission to the contrary notwithstanding, the practice
of assigning legal advisers to military commands—contrived to ensure that
90. Rome Statute, supra note 70, art. 32(2), at 108.
91. Antje C. Berger, Legal Advisers in Armed Forces, in 6 THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 779, 783 (Rudiger Wolfrum ed., 2012).
92. See Amichai Cohen & Yuval Shani, Beyond the Grave Breaches Regime: The Duty to Investigate Alleged Violations of International Law Governing Armed Conflicts, 14 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 37, 77 (2011).
93. Cf. Michael F. Lohr & Steve Gallotta, Legal Support in War: The Role of Military Lawyers,
4 CHICAGO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 465, 478 (2003).
94. See GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 400 (2010).
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decision-makers will be able to gain access to professional LOAC counsel in
real time—is here to stay. Like the dissemination of LOAC to the armed
forces, the issuance of proper general orders, and the sponsoring of training
courses (adjusted to rank and function), the availability of legal advisers to
military commanders is an immensely useful tool. All the same, it must be
conceded that this is not by itself a panacea.
No device designed to foster implementation of LOAC can be fail-safe.
The integration of legal advisers into the battle environment does not rule
out bad judgment calls leading to the espousal of wrongful actions. Such
miscues can spawn individual criminal responsibility of legal advisers, while
possibly exculpating military commanders. These are theoretical issues that
have not yet been scrutinized in practice. Still, inevitably, they are bound to
come to the surface (in as yet unknown forms) in future armed conflicts.
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